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Abstract. Should we allow grave harm to befall one individual so as to prevent minor
harms befalling sufficiently many other individuals? This is a question of aggregation.
Can many small harms “add up”, so that, collectively, they morally outweigh a greater
harm? The “Close Enough View” supports a moderate position: aggregation is per-
missible when, and only when, the conflicting harms are sufficiently similar, or “close
enough”, to each other. This paper examines the Close Enough View. It surveys a
range of formally precise interpretations of this view, and reveals some of the problems
they face. It also proposes a novel interpretation which avoids the problems of the
others.
1 Introduction
You can’t always please everyone. Frequent are the circumstances in which benefiting
some people requires burdening others. For example, allowing pesticides may help farm-
ers but hurt beekeepers. How should such conflicts be resolved? One factor that seems
surely relevant is the size of the harms or benefits involved. We ought to avert the
greater harm, or bestow the greater benefit, other things being equal. For instance, if
the livelihoods of beekeepers would be destroyed by pesticides, whereas farmers would be
only mildly inconvenienced by banning them, then this would speak strongly in favour of
a ban. More controversial, however, is another factor: the number of harms or benefits.
Suppose the farmers are many but the beekeepers few. Does this count against a ban?
Could a difference in the number of harms be so great as to outweigh a large disparity
in their size? As commonly put, should the numbers count?
Intuitions may be pumped in either direction.1 Consider first the following well-
known example (Scanlon, 1998, 235). During a live TV broadcast of the World Cup final,
an accident in the transmitter room leaves an engineer trapped under heavy electrical
equipment. He is badly injured and suffering painful electrical shocks. Rescuing him
would require interrupting the broadcast for 15 minutes. The match will not be over for
another 45 minutes.2 Should the rescuers wait till it ends? The trapped engineer, if not
rescued immediately, will suffer a harm much greater than the harm to any individual
TV viewer of missing fifteen minutes of football. On the other hand, the one engineer
is vastly outnumbered by the millions of viewers. Many agree with Scanlon that the
latter consideration is irrelevant. Regardless of how many are watching the broadcast,
we ought to save the engineer straightaway. The claim, to be clear, is not merely that
the number of viewers required to justify delaying the rescue is very, very large, nor even
that it is so large that, given contingent facts about the population of our planet and so
on, it could never in practice be reached. Rather, it is the stronger claim that there is
no such number, not even a practically unattainable one. For any number n, we should
not allow one person to suffer in agony for 45 minutes in order to allow n people to each
enjoy fifteen minutes of minor pleasure, were it possible to do this.
We should, of course, be cautious in trusting our intuitions, especially in cases like
this. The number of World Cup viewers may already too large for us to comprehend. But
1See, e.g., (Voorhoeve, 2014, 64–65).
2I have slightly adjusted the timing from Scanlon’s original example, to avoid a minor technical hitch.
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Scanlon’s claim applies to even larger, unimaginably large numbers. As Broome (2004,
57–59) points out, intuitions about such large numbers are not generally reliable.3 Still,
it would be rash simply to dismiss these intuitions out of hand. It is worthwhile to
consider whether they can be accommodated by an otherwise plausible view.
Consider now a variation of Scanlon’s example. In this case, there is no accident but
instead a fault prevents the broadcast from reaching some viewers. Repairing the fault
would require interrupting the broadcast to all viewers for fifteen minutes. As before,
the match still has 45 minutes to run. Should the fault be fixed? Here it seems the
numbers are relevant. Were we to learn the fault is affecting only a handful of viewers,
then it would seem reasonable to leave repairs till after the match. Though the harm to
the affected viewers would be greater (missing 45 minutes of football, as opposed to only
15), these viewers are but a tiny proportion of the TV audience. On the other hand, if
the vast majority of viewers were affected, it would be right to fix the fault immediately.
In intermediate cases, it may be less clear what is the right thing to do. But the numbers
involved would be a relevant factor.
Examples like these may lead us to seek a middle ground, a “moderate” view ac-
cording to which numbers count in some cases but not others. But what makes this
difference? The following seems a natural answer. Each of these cases involves a conflict
between two harms. These “conflict” in the sense that it is impossible to prevent both.
In the second case, where numbers do seem to count, the conflicting harms are very
similar. There is not a great difference between being deprived of football viewing for
45 minutes versus 15 minutes. In the first case, on the other hand, where numbers do
not seem to count, the harms are very dissimilar. There is quite a significant difference
between being deprived of football viewing versus suffering intense physical pain.4
Scanlon suggests a view along these lines. He describes it as follows.
If one harm, though not as serious as another, is nonetheless serious enough
to be morally “relevant” to it, then it is appropriate, in deciding whether
to prevent more serious harms at the cost of not being able to prevent a
greater number of less serious ones, to take into account the number of harms
involved on each side. But if one harm is not only less serious than, but not
even “relevant to”, some greater one, then we do not need to take the number
of people who would suffer these two harms into account in deciding which to
prevent, but should always prevent the more serious harm. (Scanlon, 1998,
239-40)
Parfit calls this the “Close Enough View”. He defines it as follows.
When burdens to different people are close enough in size, one greater bur-
den could be morally out-weighed by a sufficient number of lesser burdens.
(Parfit, 2003, 378)
As Parfit notes, however, this does not yet ensure moderation. Even Utilitarians, for
example, may accept the Close Enough View as defined, because they believe that all
3See (Voorhoeve, 2014, 75–76) for a counterargument to Broome.
4Some may object that being deprived of pleasure is no harm at all; the absence of a benefit is not
the same the presence of a harm. Personally, I am disinclined to put much weight on this distinction.
It rests on the selection of a “baseline”, relative to which benefits and harms are calculated. But this is
entirely a contextualist matter: what may properly be called a harm in one context may no less properly
be called the withholding of a benefit in another. There is no further fact as to which context is correct.
But, in any case, this is an inessential feature of the examples. We could devise variants where it is more
clearly harm on both sides, and intuitions, I conjecture, would be much the same.
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burdens are close enough. To capture the moderate spirit of the Close Enough View, we
need, therefore, to add that some but not all burdens are close enough.
Neither Scanlon nor Parfit develops this view in precise detail. Voorhoeve (2014)
proposes a more detailed version, which he calls “Aggregate Relevant Claims”. But
he explicitly restricts this view to a limited range of cases (Voorhoeve, 2014, 67). My
primary aim in this paper is to remedy these deficits, to investigate the prospects for
developing a formally precise and comprehensive version of the Close Enough View.5
This is an important project. A view that is appealing when applied to simple cases
may turn out to have unpalatable implications when extended further.
I proceed as follows. I begin by defining a formal framework with which to rep-
resent distributive views. These are formally represented by “choice functions”. I then
delineate a subclass of choice functions, which I call “moderate”. The candidate interpre-
tations of the Close Enough View to be evaluated are drawn from this subclass. I then
evaluate some specific candidates. These I divide into two camps: “individualist” and
“collectivist”. An individualist view compares harms only between individuals, whereas
a “collectivist” view compares harms also between collections of individuals. Each of the
candidates considered is a generalisation of a familiar “extreme” view (one that requires
aggregation either always or never).
I argue that some of the candidates are unacceptable, because they have problematic
implications. In particular, I reject some choice functions which may be seen as natural
extensions of Voorhoeve’s proposal. But I also propose another candidate, the combi-
nation of conditions I call “Individualist-Collectivist Hybrid” and “Transitive Closure
Maximisation”, and show that this avoids the problems of the others. This family of
choice functions, I argue, provides the most promising interpretation of the Close Enough
View. However, as I also point out, Individualist-Collectivist Hybrid has features that
some may find unappealing. So some may instead treat this as an argument for extrem-
ism. In any case, my investigation will reveal some of the costs of moderation. Whether
these costs are worth paying I will not try to definitively answer.
2 Preliminaries
My aim in this section is to delineate a particular subclass of distributive views — or
choice functions, as they will be formally represented — from which the candidates to
be evaluated in the remainder of the paper will be drawn. Given the vastness of the
space of possible choice functions, it is helpful to narrow our focus in this way. To do
this, I need to define a general formal framework. This will involve formally defining the
concept of a “harm” and of what I call its “significance”. The relation of being “close
enough” is then defined in terms of significance. Finally, I show that, within the class of
choice functions defined, the degree to which a choice function is friendly to aggregation
is represented by a single parameter.
2.1 Basic Framework
I begin by laying out some assumptions underlying the formal framework to be adopted.
I assume that the permissibility of an action (or policy, etc.) depends solely on the value
of its outcome in comparison with the those of its alternatives. I set aside uncertainty,
so that each available action is associated with a single outcome. In effect, the options
between which one chooses are outcomes. I assume, further, that the value of an outcome
supervenes on the distribution of wellbeing it contains: if two outcomes contain the same
5My discussion is still limited in two important respects: I do not consider uncertainty or variable
population cases. More on this below.
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distribution, then they must be equally good. In short, I assume a “consequentialist”
and “welfarist” framework.
By the “population” of an outcome, I mean the set of individuals who exist in that
outcome. I need to allow outcomes with arbitrarily large populations (though, to avoid
unnecessary complications, I assume populations must be finite). The Close Enough
View claims, for example, that preventing one death is better than curing “any number”
of mild headaches. To represent this claim in my framework, it must therefore be possible
for any number of people to exist. However, again for simplicity, I consider only “same
people” choices, where all available outcomes share a common population.
Let N = {1, 2, . . . } be the set of all possible individuals.6 An outcome is a function
a : N → R+ ∪ {Ω}, such that the set Na = {i ∈ N : a(i) 6= Ω}, called the population of
a, is finite. Thus a(i) is either a non-negative real number, representing the wellbeing
of individual i, or Ω, representing non-existence.7 I assume wellbeing is measurable and
interpersonally comparable on a ratio scale. For neatness, I shall sometimes write ai
instead of a(i).
A choice situation is a non-empty, finite set of outcomes A with a common population
(i.e., Na = Nb for all a, b ∈ A). Let A be the set of all choice situations. The purpose of a
distributive view is to determine, for a given choice situation, which of the options may
permissibly be chosen. Such a view I represent by a choice function γ : A → A ∪ {∅}
such that γ(A) ⊆ A. The options in γ(A) are those which may permissibility be chosen
from A. Thus a choice function may contract the agent’s choice situation by eliminating
some options as impermissible. (I have here left open the possibility that γ(A) is empty,
so that all options are eliminated. I return to this issue below.)
It will be useful to impose a further condition on choice functions. Let σ be a
permutation of N. Then I shall write σa to denote the composition of a with σ (i.e., σa =
a◦σ). So σa(i) = a(σ(i)) for all i ∈ N. And I shall write σA to denote the choice situation
{σa : a ∈ A}. The further condition may now be stated as follows: γ(σA) = σγ(A).
This requires that the choice function is, in a certain sense, “anonymous”. Suppose we
begin with one choice situation and then transform this by uniformly replacing some of
the individuals. If individual i is replaced by individual j in one outcome, then i must
also be replaced by j in every other outcome. The distribution of wellbeing levels in each
outcome remains the same, except that which particular individuals have these levels
may change. If j replaces i, then j must receive i’s wellbeing level in every outcome.
This condition requires that which outcomes are permissible should remain unchanged
by this transformation.
This seems incredibly plausible. Moreover, it also has the expository benefit of
simplifying some of the definitions to be given below. I shall write (x1, x2, . . . xn) to
denote the outcome a such that
ai =
{
xi if i ≤ n
Ω if i > n
Further, where n consecutive places in such a sequence have the same value x, I shall
abbreviate this as n×x. Thus, for example, (3×x) = (x, x, x) and (x, 2× y) = (x, y, y).
The set of choice situations involving outcomes that can be denoted in this way is a
proper subset of all choice situations. However, given the anonymity condition, it follows
that a choice function must be reducible to the choice situations in this subset. If the
choice function satisfies a condition that is explicitly defined only for situations in this
6For simplicity, I assume these are countably infinite.
7By R+ I mean the non-negative reals. The reason for excluding negative wellbeing is that the
“prioritarian” views I shall consider do not satisfy “ratio-scale invariance” when negative wellbeing is
included, as shown, e.g., by Brown (2007).
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subset, then it must implicitly satisfy this condition for all situations. This fact may be
exploited to give simpler definitions of such conditions.
A binary choice situation is one containing only two options. In this context, a choice
function may be represented by a binary relation. For a choice function γ, let γ be
a binary relation such that a γ b if and only if a ∈ γ({a, b}). Thus a γ b may be
read as saying that, according to γ, it is permissible to choose a rather than b (when
these are the only options). Let γ and ∼γ be, respectively, the asymmetric and the
symmetric parts of γ . So we have a γ b if and only if γ({a, b}) = {a}, and a ∼γ b if
and only if γ({a, b}) = {a, b}. Thus a γ b may be read as “it is obligatory to choose
a rather than b”, and a ∼γ b as “it is optional to choose either a or b” (again when
these are the only options). Occasionally, I shall speak a little loosely, expressing a γ b
as “a is better than b”. But I should stress that this is not the official definition. For
one thing, it is plausible to think that “better than” necessarily expresses a transitive
relation. But it is less clear that γ , as defined above, must be transitive (more on this
below, subsection 4.1). In what follows, I suppress the subscript γ, writing simply ,
but it should be borne in mind that this relation is defined relative to a choice function.
2.2 Harms and Their Significance
The Close Enough View, recall, is a proposal for adjudicating between conflicting harms.
So I need to explain how harms are represented in the formal model. I assume a coun-
terfactual definition of harm: a person is harmed to the extent that her wellbeing is
less than it would have been otherwise. This assumes, of course, that there is some de-
terminate fact as to what would have happened otherwise. Happily, for binary choices,
this is no problem. The options in a choice situation are assumed to be exhaustive: one
of them must be chosen. Thus, if there are only two options, then whichever option is
chosen, the other is what would have happened otherwise. (For obvious reasons, this
is less straightforward in non-binary choices. I return to this below.) Suppose the two
options are a and b, and a is the chosen option. Then, as a result, ai is the wellbeing
of individual i, and bi the wellbeing i would have had otherwise. So i is harmed in a if
and only if ai < bi, and the size of the harm is max{0, bi − ai}. (Notice, I do not allow
“negative” harms, and a harm of size zero is really no harm at all.)
I distinguish between the size of a harm and its significance. By “significance” I
mean roughly the strength of moral reason we have to prevent the harm. On some
views, significance simply reduces to size: we ought always to prevent the greater harm.
But others reject this. Consider, for example, the following pair of outcomes.
1 2
a 9 100
b 10 98
Here individual 1 is harmed in a, and individual 2 is harmed in b. Although the latter
harm is greater in size (10− 9 < 100− 98), we may nonetheless believe this harm is less
significant, because the other, smaller harm falls on a worse-off individual, who will have
less wellbeing in any case. On this view, some priority should be given to preventing
harms to the worse off. I want to leave open the possibility of such “prioritarian” views.
The significance given to a harm by a distributive view, represented here by a choice
function γ, is revealed by the choices γ prescribes. For the following definitions, let a
and b be outcomes with a common population, which includes at least two individuals,
i and j, such that ai < bi and bj < aj . So i is harmed in a, and j in b. Then I shall say
that the harm to i in a is at least as significant as the harm to j in b, according to γ, if
and only if
(bi, bj)  (ai, aj)
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Thus, to compare the relative significance of two harms, we consider a pair of options
in which only these harms are present. Whichever harm we ought to prevent in this
situation is the more significant.8
In some cases, a distributive view may say that one harm is “infinitely more” signif-
icant than another, in the sense that preventing one individual’s suffering this harm is
better than preventing any number of individuals’ suffering the other harm. In this case,
I say that the more significant harm “trumps” the less significant. That is, the harm to
i in a trumps the harm to j in b, according to γ, if and only if, for any n > 0,
(bi, n× bj)  (ai, n× aj)
Finally, I say two harms are “close enough” if and only if neither harm trumps the
other. That is, the harm to i in a is close enough to the harm to j in b, according to γ,
if and only if, for some n,m > 0,
(bi, n× bj) 6 (ai, n× aj) and (m× ai, aj) 6 (m× bi, bj)
Notice, by definition, “close enough” is a symmetric relation. This may seem a departure
from ordinary usage. For example, we might say that a replica of a guitar is close enough
to the original, but it would be odd to say that the original is close enough to the replica.
In response, I should stress that “close enough” is here used as a semi-technical term.9
2.3 Regularity
It will be helpful to narrow my focus to a subclass of choice functions. These are choice
functions according to which the relations of significance have a certain simple structure,
defined by the following two conditions.
First, the comparative significance of harms is determined by a strictly increasing,
and concave function f .10 So significance is determined not by the difference in wellbeing
levels, but rather by the difference in f -weighted wellbeing levels. That is, the harm to
i in a is at least as significant as the harm to j in b if and only if
f(bi)− f(ai) ≥ f(aj)− f(bj)
This allows, but does not require, some degree of priority to the worse off. If f is linear,
then significance reduces to size. But if f is strictly concave, then a smaller harm may
be more significant than a larger harm. This condition does, however, exclude absolute
priority to the worse off. Significance must at least be influenced by size, even if not
exclusively determined by it. This seems reasonable. It rules out distributive views
according to which, for example, a worse off person’s suffering a brief mild headache is
more significant than a better off person’s dying. But such extreme views hold little
appeal from a moderate perspective.
8Some may object to this reduction on the grounds that the significance of the harm to one individual
may partly depend on the harms to other individuals. In response to this objection, I would stress that
“significance” is being used here as a technical term, which need not perfectly match its ordinary meaning.
I could perhaps say instead something like “instrinsic significance” to allay such worries. But that would
be too messy.
9And in any case, the example might be explained by conversational implicature. It might be true
that the original is close enough to the replica, but nonetheless infelicitous to say so.
10By saying that f is strictly increasing I mean that it slopes upwards, i.e., if x > y then f(x) > f(y).
By saying that f is concave I mean that it does not curve upwards; either it is linear or it curves
downwards. In the latter case, I say f is strictly concave.More precisely, f is concave if, for any x, y and
any λ ∈ [0, 1],
f(λx+ (1− λ)y) ≥ f(λx) + f((1− λ)y)).
For the definition of strict concavity, replace ≥ with > in the above.
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Second, whether one harm trumps another depends on the ratio of their “signifi-
cances”. More specifically, there exists a ratio ρ ∈ [0, 1] such that the harm to i in a
trumps the harm to j in b if and only if
f(aj)− f(bj)
f(bi)− f(ai) < ρ
For example, suppose f is linear and ρ = 1/2. Then, for a smaller harm to be close
enough to a larger harm, the smaller must be at least half as great as the larger. If it is
only, say, one third as great, then it is trumped by the larger harm.11
A choice function that satisfies these two conditions I call, for lack of a better term,
“regular”. That is, a regular choice function satisfies the following condition.
Regularity. There exists a strictly increasing and concave function f and a ratio ρ ∈
[0, 1], such that, for any x, y, x+, y+ ∈ R+, with x < x+, y < y+,
1. (x+, y)  (x, y+) if and only if f(x+)− f(x) ≥ f(y+)− f(y);
2. there exists an n > 0 such that (n× x, y+) 6 (n× x+, y) if and only if
f(x+)− f(x)
f(y+)− f(y) ≥ ρ
I believe Regularity is a plausible condition. As we will see, it is compatible with a
broad range of views. In a fuller treatment, I could offer an argument for this condition.
But that would be beyond the scope of this paper. By restricting the candidates in this
way, I do risk overlooking an irregular choice function that provides a more plausible
interpretation of the Close Enough View. Nonetheless, I believe the significant gain
in simplicity warrants this risk. Hereafter, by “choice function” I refer only to regular
choice functions.
2.4 Moderation
Choice functions may be classified along a spectrum of attitudes to aggregation. A
moderate view, as I said earlier, is one that allows aggregation sometimes but not always.
In the framework defined above, this means that more significant harms trump less
significant harms in some cases but not in others. That is, a moderate choice function
satisfies both of the following conditions.
Moderate Aggregation. In some cases, a more significant harm does not trump a less
significant harm.
Moderate Non-Aggregation. In some cases, a more significant harm does trump a
less significant harm.
By assuming Regularity, I have not ruled out extremism. For example, if ρ = 1, then
Moderate Aggregation is violated. This would be a form of extreme “non-aggregationism”.
On the other hand, if ρ = 0, then Moderate Non-Aggregation is violated. This would
be a form of extreme “aggregationism”. Between these two extremes, we have moderate
views according to which 0 < ρ < 1. Thus we may treat ρ as a parameter measuring
the extent to which a choice function is non-aggregationist. The greater is ρ, the more
non-aggregationist is the choice function (at least when holding f constant).
11The question of how this ratio is determined I will not address here. On this issue I recommend
Voorhoeve (2014).
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Selecting a particular f and ρ determines the choice function only for a limited
class of choice situations. This includes only binary choices between outcomes in which
harms are uniform (i.e., all harmed individuals in an outcome suffer the same harm).
The question, then, is how to the extend the choice function beyond this limited class.
I take this in two steps. First, I consider binary choices with non-uniform harms. Then
I consider non-binary choices.
3 Binary Choices
I turn now to evaluating some candidate interpretations of the Close Enough View, in
the context of binary choice only. Before discussing specific candidates, however, I need
to address an objection that applies to all such views. Indeed, this objection applies to all
views that accept Moderate Non-Aggregation, including also extreme non-aggregationist
views. Having dealt with this objection, I then consider some collectivist candidates,
before turning to some individualist candidates.
3.1 Anonymity
The objection, in brief, is that Moderate Non-Aggregation is jointly inconsistent with
two further conditions, both of which, initially at least, may seem very plausible. As I
argue, however, one of these conditions is not so plausible after all, and supporters of
Moderate Non-Aggregation may feel comfortable rejecting it.
The first condition is commonly called “Anonymity”. The basic idea is that the
identities of individuals should not matter. All that should matter is the “anonymised”
distribution of wellbeing. Suppose one outcome can be obtained from another merely
by rearranging the “name-tags” attached to wellbeing levels. Then the choice between
these outcomes must be a matter of moral indifference. I shall give this condition another
name, “Permutation Invariance,” because, for reasons given below, I am sceptical about
whether it is merely a requirement of anonymity. It may be defined as follows.
Permutation Invariance. a ∼ σa.12
The second condition I call “Non-Arbitrariness”. This requires that if the most
significant harm in a is trumped by the least significant harm in b, then we ought to
choose a. This seems very plausible. Imagine, for example, a view that implies each of
the following claims.
1. We ought to prevent one death rather than prevent any number of broken arms.
2. We ought to prevent one death rather than prevent any number of headaches.
3. For sufficiently large numbers n and m, we ought to prevent n broken arms and
m headaches rather than prevent one death.
Such a view seems quite arbitrary. If aggregation is not appropriate when death conflicts
either with broken arms or headaches alone, how can it be appropriate when death con-
flicts with some combination of the two? This condition rules out such views. Formally,
it is defined as follows. Let Hab be the set of all individuals harmed in a, relative to b
(i.e., those who will be harmed if b is chosen rather than a). So Hab = {i : ai < bi}.
Then we have:
12This condition must be restricted to permutations that are, as we might say, Na-preserving. That
is, we must have i ∈ Na if and only if σ(i) ∈ Na. This ensures that {a, σa} is a choice situation, i.e.,
with a fixed population.
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Non-Arbitrariness. b 6 a only if
max
i∈Hba
f(ai)− f(bi) ≥ ρ min
i∈Hab
f(bi)− f(ai)
That Moderate Non-Aggregation, Permutation Invariance, and Non-Arbitrariness
are jointly inconsistent can be shown as follows. Suppose ρ > 0, as required by Moderate
Non-Aggregation. Then there must exist a positive integer m such that
f(1/m)− f(0) < ρ(f(1)− f(0))
Without loss of generality, suppose m = 2. (It should be clear that the proof generalises
to any positive integer m > 1.) We may then consider the following outcomes.13
1 2 3
a 0 1/2 1
b 1/2 1 0
Clearly Permutation Invariance implies a ∼ b.14 But it follows from the definition of
m, and the concavity of f , that the one harm in b (to individual 3) trumps both of the
harms in a (to individuals 1 and 2).15 So Non-Arbitrariness then implies a  b.
In my view, this is not a compelling objection to Moderate Non-Aggregation. Mod-
erates may instead reject Permutation Invariance. This condition is intended to capture
the ideal of “moral equality”: all individuals’ interests should be given equal weight, and
no one should be favoured simply because of who she is. But Permutation Invariance
actually requires more than this. Consider the following two pairs of outcomes.
1 2 3
a 0 1/2 1
b 1/2 1 0
1 2 3
c 1 1/2 0
d 0 1 1/2
A non-aggregationist view that judges a better than b will also judge c better than d.
But this shows that there is no violation here of moral equality. This view favours
preventing harm to individual 3 in the first choice (a vs b), not because of who she is,
but because of her situation. Moving to the second choice (c vs d), individual 1 is now in
the same situation that individual 3 was in, and now this view favours preventing harm
to individual 1. Although this view violates Permutation Invariance, it cannot fairly be
accused of weighing the interests of some individuals more highly than those of others.
The ideal of moral equality is better captured by a weaker condition. Let a transpo-
sition be a permutation τ such that τ ◦ τ is the identity function, i.e., τ(τ(i)) = i for all
i. A transposition merely “swaps” the positions of one or more pairs of individuals, so
that applying the permutation twice swaps them back again, returning us to where we
started. Then the condition I propose is the following.
Transposition Invariance. a ∼ τa.
Suppose we are choosing between outcomes a and τa. Then, for any individual i
who suffers a harm in a, there is another individual, τ(i), who suffers precisely the same
harm in τa. The harms in a are identical to the harms in τa, except for the identities
of who is harmed. Therefore, if all individuals’ interests are weighed equally, we must
13Parfit (2003, 383, n. 16) discusses a case like this, and Voorhoeve (2014, 82–84) discusses a variant
of Parfit’s case.
14Let σ be the permutation of N such that σ(1) = 2, σ(2) = 3, σ(3) = 1, and σ(i) = i for i > 3. Then
b = σa.
15From the definition of m we have f(1/2) − f(0) < ρ(f(1) − f(0)). And since f is concave, f(1) −
f(1/2) ≤ f(1/2)− f(0). So we also have f(1)− f(1/2) < ρ(f(1)− f(0)).
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be indifferent between a and τa. In this way, Transposition Invariance captures moral
equality.16
Clearly, Permutation Invariance implies Transposition Invariance, but not vice versa
(because the transpositions are a proper subset of the permutations). The permutations
involved in the examples above are not transpositions, and therefore Transposition In-
variance does not apply in these cases. Moderate Non-Aggregation is consistent with
the conjunction of Transposition Invariance and Non-Arbitrariness.17 So we may accept
a plausible form of anonymity while rejecting extreme aggregation.
3.2 Collectivism
Having dealt with that general objection, I may now move on to evaluating some specific
candidates. The first I consider is a form of collectivism. I first define an extreme form
of collectivism, and then show how this may be generalised to accommodate moderation.
This extreme form of collectivism tells us to minimise the total significance of unpre-
vented harms; or, in other words, to choose the outcome in which the harms have the
least total significance. This class of choice functions may be defined as follows.
Extreme Collectivism. a  b if and only if∑
i∈Hab
f(bi)− f(ai) ≤
∑
i∈Hba
f(ai)− f(bi)
This is in fact equivalent to a familiar class of choice functions, sometimes called
“Generalised Utilitarianism”. If f is linear, it is equivalent to the view that we should
maximise total wellbeing (a.k.a. Utilitarianism).18 If f is strictly concave, it is equiv-
alent to the view that we ought to maximise total priority-weighted wellbeing (a.k.a.
Prioritarianism).
Extreme Collectivism implies ρ = 0, and so is incompatible with Moderate Non-
Aggregation. How might Extreme Collectivism be generalised so as to allow modera-
tion? The generalisation I shall consider is inspired by Voorhoeve’s “Aggregate Relevant
Claims” (Voorhoeve, 2014, 66). As the name suggests, Voorhoeve frames his proposal
in terms of claims, rather than harms. But this difference seems merely terminological.
For Voorhoeve, when a person is harmed in an outcome, she has a claim against this
outcome (or, as he might prefer to say, a claim in favour of the other outcome). The
strength of a claim depends both on the size of the harm and on how badly off is the
claimant. Thus, where I talk of preventing more significant harms, Voorhoeve talks
instead of satisfying stronger claims. So far as I can tell, this amounts to essentially
the same thing. I should also note that Voorhoeve explicitly restricts his proposal to
16It should be noted that every permutation may be decomposed into a sequence of transpositions.
So, if ∼ is transitive, then Transposition Invariance collapses into Permutation Invariance. However, as
I point out below, non-aggregationists are already committed to denying the transitivity of ∼.
17Given the definition of a choice function, which includes an anonymity condition, Transposition
Invariance is equivalent to the following: for any Na-preserving transposition σ, γ({a, σa}) 6= ∅.
18 Because Hab ∩Hba = ∅, and because ai = bi for all i 6∈ Hab ∪Hba, we have∑
i∈Hab
f(bi)− f(ai)−
∑
i∈Hba
f(ai)− f(bi) =
∑
i∈Hab
f(bi)− f(ai) +
∑
i∈Hba
f(bi)− f(ai)
=
∑
i∈I
f(bi)− f(ai)
=
∑
i∈I
f(bi)−
∑
i∈I
f(ai)
Thus
∑
i∈Hab f(bi)− f(ai) ≤
∑
i∈Hba f(ai)− f(bi) if and only if
∑
i∈I f(ai) ≥
∑
i∈I f(bi).
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a limited class of choice situations, which does not include some of those I discuss be-
low. The view I suggest seems the most natural extension of his proposal to these other
cases. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the problems I raise are not strictly speaking
problems for Aggregate Relevant Claims.
The basic idea is that, rather than aggregating all harms, we aggregate only “rele-
vant” harms. A harm is relevant if and only if it is not trumped by any conflicting harm.
Irrelevant harms, says Voorhoeve, should “play no role” in determining which outcome
to choose (Voorhoeve, 2014, 66). Thus his proposal is like Extreme Collectivism, except
it disregards all irrelevant harms. That is, it tells us to minimise the total significance
of all relevant unprevented harms. Let Rab be the set of individuals who are relevantly
harmed in a relative to b.19 So we have
Rab = {i ∈ Hab : ∀j ∈ Hba f(bi)− f(ai) ≥ ρ(f(aj)− f(bj))}
Then we may define the following condition.
Generalised Collectivism. a  b if and only if∑
i∈Rab
f(bi)− f(ai) ≤
∑
i∈Rba
f(ai)− f(bi)
Generalised Collectivism is a generalisation of Extreme Collectivism, in the sense
that the choice functions satisfying the former are a proper superset of those satisfying
the latter. If ρ = 0 then all harms are relevant, Rab = Hab, so in this case Gener-
alised Collectivism is equivalent to Extreme Collectivism. But Generalised Collectivism
is also compatible with the conjunction of Moderate Aggregation and Moderate Non-
Aggregation (i.e., we may have 0 < ρ < 1).
Does Generalised Collectivism provide a satisfactory interpretation of the Close
Enough View? I shall argue that it does not. Consider the following condition.
Permutation Pareto. If a is Pareto-superior to σb then a  b.20
Friends of Moderate Non-Aggregation may reject Permutation Pareto for the same
reason that I argued above they may reject Permutation Invariance. However, sup-
pose we weaken Permutation Pareto in the same way that suggested we should weaken
Permutation Invariance. This gives us the following condition.
Transposition Pareto. If a is Pareto-superior to τb then a  b.21
Transposition Pareto and Generalised Collectivism together imply Extreme Collec-
tivism. That is, given Transposition Pareto, our generalisation collapses into its extreme
form. Suppose as before, without loss of generality, that
f(1/2)− f(0) < ρ(f(1)− f(0))
Then consider the following outcomes.
1 2 3
a 0 1 1/2
b 1 0 0
19Strictly speaking, this should have further subscripts, Rabfρ, indicating that this set is defined also
relative to a function f and ratio ρ. But I omit these for neatness.
20a is Pareto-superior to b if and only if Na = Nb, ai ≥ bi for all i ∈ Na, and ai > bi for some i ∈ Na.
Is Close Enough Good Enough? — 12
Since the harm to individual 3 in b is deemed irrelevant, Generalised Collectivism implies
a ∼ b. But clearly Transposition Pareto implies a  b, since b is obtained from a merely
by swapping individuals 1 and 2.
This seems a troubling result for moderate forms of Generalised Collectivism. What
reason can be given for allowing the harm to individual 3? One might say that allowing
this harm is necessary in order to prevent the much more significant harm to individual 1.
But in allowing the harm to individual 3, we also allow a harm to individual 2 which
is equally as significant as the harm that we prevent. So far as “relevant” harms are
concerned, there is a perfect tie. We should then be able to use “irrelevant” harms to
break this tie. But Generalised Collectivism denies these harms even this minor tie-
breaking role. Or, to put the point differently, these harms should not be treated as
entirely irrelevant, but rather should be given the minimal relevance of tie-breakers.
Someone might object to this argument with an example like the following. Suppose
we can save the life of only one of two people, Anne or Bob, where the the harm of
dying is precisely the same for both. So we have a tie. Before tossing our coin, however,
we realise that cost of saving Anne’s life is slightly more. If we choose to save Bob
instead, then we will save $1, which we may use to buy an ice-cream for Cathy. So if we
save Anne’s life, then, as well as Bob, Cathy will also be harmed: she will miss out on
the ice-cream. However, it may seem absurd to use such a trivial harm to break a tie
involving so serious a harm as death.22
I have two responses to this objection. First, it points to the issue of vagueness in
interpersonal comparisons of wellbeing. The formal framework adopted here assumes
that we can make these comparisons in a very precise way. In practice, however, it is
very unlikely that we could ever be confident that the harm of death would be precisely
the same for Anne and Bob. Rather, we could say only that these harms are equal
within a certain margin of error. Since the small harm to Cathy is within this margin
of error, adding it to the scales makes no practical difference. In practice, such minor
harms may be irrelevant. On the other hand, if we can imagine occupying a “god-like”
perspective from which we can determine that the harms to Anne and Bob really are
precisely the same, then it seems to me that it would be wrong, from this perspective,
simply to disregard Cathy.
Second, it is important to recognise that wrongness comes in degrees. Some wrong
actions may be less wrong than others. Now consider a different example which involves
only Cathy. We can either give her the ice-cream or destroy it. It would be a gratuitous
harm, and therefore wrong, to destroy the ice-cream. But it would be only a minor
wrong. Likewise, in the original case, it may be only a comparably minor wrong to save
Anne’s life rather than Bob’s.
So Generalised Collectivism, I conclude, is unacceptable. But it may be modified
to avoid this problem. Whereas Extreme Collectivism gives irrelevant harms too much
weight, Generalised Collectivism gives them too little. A solution, then, may be a
combination of these two conditions in which the latter has lexcial priority over the
former. This gives us the following condition.
Lexical Generalised Collectivism. First, minimise the total significance of relevant
unprevented harms (as in Generalised Collectivism). Second, in the case of a tie, min-
imise the total significance of all unprevented harms (as in Extreme Collectivism).
Lexical Generalised Collectivism is compatible with the conjunction of Transposition
Pareto, Moderate Aggregation, and Moderate Non-Aggregation.23 A general problem
22Kamm (2005, 13-14) discusses similar examples.
23The binary division of harms into “relevant” and “irrelevant” may seem too coarse-grained in some
cases. It could be the case that, among the subset of irrelevant harms, some of these trump others. In
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with lexical priority, however, is that it allows very small differences to have very great
weight. This can be seen in the case of Lexical Generalised Collectivism. If there is no tie
to break, then irrelevant harms are again entirely ignored. This may seem implausible
in cases where the more relevant harms, though not strictly tied, are very close to being
so.
Consider a variation of the World Cup example. In this case there are two trapped
engineers, but we can rescue only one at a time. One of the engineers, as before, can
only be rescued by interrupting the broadcast, whereas the other can be rescued without
any interruption. Since the marginal harm to either engineer of having to wait to be
rescued second would be the same, we decide to rescue first the one that requires no
interruption. The harms to the TV viewers, though trumped, still tip the balance in this
case of a tie. But now we learn that the other engineer is suffering very slightly more.
He is trapped is in a hotter area of the building, and he finds heat unpleasant. It may
seem odd that this very slight change should cause us to reverse our decision. Although,
strictly speaking, there is no tie between the engineers, it is “close enough” to being a
tie. If the harms to the TV viewers are significant enough to break a strict tie, it may
seem, they must also be weighty enough to break what is very nearly a tie.
This may be put more formally in terms of the following condition.
Expanded Tie-breaking. For any x, y, with 0 < x < y, if (0, x, y)  (y, 0, 0) then for
some  > 0, (0, x, y − )  (y, 0, 0).
This requires that if a less significant harm can tip the balance in a conflict between
two equal more significant harms, then it can also do so in an arbitrarily close conflict.
Lexical Generalised Collectivism and Expanded Tie-breaking together entail Extreme
Collectivism.24 Insofar as one accepts Transposition Pareto, it seems very hard to reject
Expanded Tie-breaking. If one allows irrelevant harms to break ties, then it there seems
little justification for not allowing them also to break almost-ties, especially given that
an almost-tie can be arbitrarily close to a tie. Therefore, in my view, Lexical Generalised
Collectivism also fails as an interpretation of the Close Enough View.
3.3 Numbers
I now consider a different approach to generalising Extreme Collectivism. I shall argue
that, though this approach has some advantages over the previous, it ultimately also
fails to provide a satisfactory interpretation of the Close Enough View.
As noted above, the issue of aggregation is often put in terms of whether “numbers
should count”. On an aggregationist view, we do allow numbers to count, in the sense
that we allow the fact that a less significant harm will be suffered by a larger number
of individuals to count in favour of preventing this harm. On a non-aggregationist view,
we do not allow numbers to count in this way. On the approach I will consider here, we
achieve a moderate position by saying that the importance of numbers — the extent to
which they count — decreases as they grow larger. Numbers are important when they
are small, but as they grow larger, their importance steadily diminishes.
Formally, this idea may be implemented by the following condition.
this case, if there is a tie between relevant harms, it may seem inappropriate simply to aggregate all
of the irrelevant harms, rather than giving priority to preventing the trumping irrelevant harm. This
problem may be solved by introducing a hierarchy of relevant harms: “Level 1 harms”, “Level 2 harms”,
and so on. For a formal definition see the Appendix.
24Lexical Generalised Collectivism implies (0, ρ, 2)  (2, 0, 0). If ρ > 0, then ρ/2 < ρ, and thus Lexical
Generalised Collectivism implies (2, 0, 0)  (0, ρ, 2 − ), for any  > 0, thereby violating Expanded
Tie-breaking.
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Weighted Numbers. For some strictly increasing, concave, positive-valued function g,
a  b if and only if
g(|Hab|)Mi∈Habf(bi)− f(ai) ≤ g(|Hba|)Mi∈Hbaf(ai)− f(bi)
Here M denotes the arithmetic mean.25 So Weighted Numbers tells us to minimise
the weighted average significance of unprevented harms, where the weighting is given by
the function g. This determines the extent to which numbers count as they increase.
If g is linear, then numbers always count, and Weighted Numbers collapses into Ex-
treme Collectivism. However, if g is strictly concave, then numbers count less as they
increase. Moreover, if g is bounded above then Weighted Numbers becomes consistent
with Moderate Non-Aggregation and Moderate Aggregation.
Suppose x < x+ and y < y+. Then Weighted Numbers implies that (x+, n × y) 
(x, n× y+) if and only if
g(1)[f(x+)− f(x)] > g(n)[f(y+)− f(y)]
This holds for all values of n if and only if
g(1)[f(x+)− f(x)] > lim
n→∞ g(n)[f(y
+)− f(y)]
Now consider, for example, the function g(x) = x/(x + 1). Notice, this function is
bounded above. In particular, we have limn→∞ g(n) = 1. Thus, given this function,
there exists an n such that (x+, n× y) 6 (x, n× y+) if and only if
1
2[f(x
+)− f(x)] ≤ [f(y+)− f(y)]
So ρ = 1/2, and therefore this satisfies both Moderate Non-Aggregation and Moderate
Aggregation.26
Weighted Numbers is compatible with the conjunction of Moderate Aggregation,
Moderate Non-Aggregation, Transposition Pareto, and Expanded Tie-breaking. So it
may appear to be an improvement over Generalised Collectivism and Lexical Generalised
Collectivism. However, Weighted Numbers also has the following very problematic fea-
ture. Say that the harm to i in a “weakly trumps” the harm to j in b, according to γ,
if and only if there exists some n such that, for any m,
(n× bi,m× bj)  (n× ai,m× aj).
Suppose the harm to i in a is only slightly greater than the harm to j in b. These harms
might be, for example, suffering a mild headache for ten minutes and nine minutes, re-
spectively. Then to say that the former harm weakly trumps the latter is to say that,
for some number n, preventing n ten-minute headaches is better than preventing any
number of nine-minute headaches. This is, of course, an absurd thing to say. However,
this is exactly what is implied by a moderate form of Weighted Numbers. This condition
combined with Moderate Non-Aggregation implies that a more significant harm always
weakly trumps a less significant harm, regardless of how small the difference in signifi-
cance may be.27 On Weighted Numbers, we cannot have any trumping at all unless we
25That is Mi∈Xφ(i) = 1|X|
∑
i∈X φ(i).
26This sort of moderate view was suggested to me by John Broome. It is similar to a view discussed,
in a different context, by Binmore and Voorhoeve (2003).
27Suppose g is bounded above (as required for consistency with Moderate Non-Aggregation). Then if
f(x+)− f(x) > f(y+)− f(y), there must be some n such that
g(n)[f(x+)− f(x)] > lim
m→∞
g(m)[f(y+)− f(y)]
Is Close Enough Good Enough? — 15
have ubiquitous weak trumping. This is not quite extreme non-aggregationsim, but it is
close enough to disqualify Weighted Numbers as an interpretation of the Close Enough
View.
3.4 Individualism
I turn now to the individualist approach. Again, I begin by defining an extreme form,
before considering how this may be generalised to allow moderation.
The extreme form of individualism tells us to minimise the significance of the most
significant unprevented harm. This gives us the following condition.28
Extreme Individualism. a  b if and only if
max
i∈Hab
f(bi)− f(ai) ≤ max
i∈Hba
f(ai)− f(bi)
Extreme Individualism is similar to Generalised Collectivism, except it counts as
“irrelevant” every harm other than the most significant.29 Thus Extreme Individualism
is also inconsistent with Transposition Pareto. But here the problem is more severe.
Consider the following outcomes.
1 2 3
a 1 1 0
b 0 0 1
In this case, Transposition Pareto implies a  b, but Extreme Individualism implies
a ∼ b, because the most significant harm is the same in both outcomes. It seems wrong,
however, to allow harm to befall two people in order to prevent the same harm befalling
only one person. Even some extreme non-aggregationists may find this too extreme.30
This problem may again be solved by adopting a lexical variant. Here I define this
condition only informally (see Appendix for a formal definition).
Lexical Extreme Individualism.
1. Choose so that either
(a) there are no unprevented harms, or
(b) the most significant unprevented harm is no more significant than the most
significant prevented harm.
2. In the event of a tie at step 1, choose so that either
(a) there is only one unprevented harm and at least two prevented harms, or
(b) the second-most significant unprevented harm is no more significant than the
second-most significant prevented harm.
3. And so on.
28Extreme Individualism is isomorphic to the so-called “minimax regret rule” for individual choice.
See, e.g., Binmore (2009, 156-7).
29One might suspect that Generalised Collectivism with ρ = 1 would be equivalent to Extreme Indi-
vidualism. But this is not quite so. Suppose the most significant harms in a and b are equally significant,
but two individuals suffer this harm in a, whereas only one suffers it in b. Then Generalised Collectivism
with ρ = 1 prefers b, but Extreme Individualism is indifferent.
30One person who famously endorses such extremism is Taurek (1977).
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Note that in this definition, for example, the “second-most significant” harm may be
equally significant as the most significant.31
Clearly Extreme Individualism and Lexical Extreme Individualism are both incom-
patible with Moderate Aggregation. If the most significant harm in one outcome is more
significant than that in the other, then no number of less significant harms, no matter
how many, can outweigh this. How might these conditions be generalised so as to allow
moderation? Here is one idea. Extreme Individualism requires that the most significant
prevented harm must be at least as significant as every unprevented harm. We may
weaken this by requiring only that the most significant prevented harm is not trumped
by any unprevented harm. This gives us the following condition.
Generalised Individualism. a  b if and only if
ρ max
i∈Hab
f(bi)− f(ai) ≤ max
i∈Hba
f(ai)− f(bi)
This definition is identical to that of Extreme Individualism except for the insertion
of the ratio ρ. Thus when ρ = 1, these two conditions become equivalent. The idea is
that moderation is achieved by setting ρ < 1. Then this condition will require only that
we come “close enough” to minimising the maximum significance of unprevented harms.
The same idea may be applied to Lexical Extreme Individualism.
Lexical Generalised Individualism. The same as Lexical Extreme Individualism,
except that “is no more significant than” is replaced by “does not trump”.
The problem with this, however, is that, given Regularity, it is in fact impossible
that ρ < 1. So these generalised conditions simply collapse into their extreme forms.
For any x > y > 0, Regularity implies (x, 0)  (0, y). It follows, given either Generalised
Individualism or Lexical Generalised Individualism, that for any x > y > 0,
f(y)− f(0) < ρ(f(x)− f(0))
But this implies ρ = 1. So these generalised conditions do not allow moderation after
all, at least not given Regularity.
To give a concrete example, suppose we can either prevent a headache to one person,
or prevent a slightly less intense headache to another person. Assume also that the
wellbeing level either individual will have if she does not suffer the headache is the
same. Since the difference in harm is only slight, the greater harm does not trump the
smaller harm, and therefore both Lexical Extreme Individualism and Lexical Generalised
Individualism are indifferent between these options. Regularity, on the other hand,
requires that we prevent the worse headache.32
This problem is solved by the following condition.33
Individualist-Collectivist Hybrid.
1. If Lexical Generalised Individualism selects a uniquely permissible option, then
choose this option.
2. Otherwise choose according to Extreme Collectivism.
31More precisely, let h be a bijection from {1, 2, . . . |Hab|} into Hab such that i < j implies f(bh(j))−
f(ah(j)) ≤ f(bh(i))− f(ah(i)). Then the i-th most significant harm in a is the harm to h(i).
32Doubts about this implication of Regularity may be met, I believe, by the points I made earlier
regarding vagueness and degrees of wrongness. We may feel that, in practice, it is not possible to know
that one headache is only slightly less intense. Also, Regularity does not imply that failing to prevent
the worse headache would be seriously wrong; it may be only slightly wrong.
33A view like this was suggested to me by Christopher Jay.
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This is a generalisation of both Extreme Collectivism and Lexical Extreme Individu-
alism. If ρ = 0, then no harm trumps any other harm. In this case, Lexical Generalised
Individualism will always imply that both options are permissible, so the decision will
be made by Extreme Collectivism. On the other hand, if ρ = 1, then Lexical Gener-
alised Individualism becomes equivalent to Lexical Extreme Individualism, which judges
both options to be permissible only if the harms in each are exactly the same. In
this case, Extreme Collectivism agrees with Lexical Extreme Individualism. Therefore,
Individualist-Collectivist Hybrid is equivalent to Extreme Collectivism when ρ = 0, and
equivalent to Lexical Extreme Individualism when ρ = 1.
Individualist-Collectivist Hybrid is compatible with Regularity even with ρ < 1. In
the example of the two headaches above, Lexical Extreme Individualism fails to select a
uniquely permissible option, and so Extreme Collectivism decides this case in favour of
preventing the worse headache. Thus Individualist-Collectivist Hybrid does not collapse
into extremism. Moreover, it is consistent with both Transposition Pareto and Expanded
Tie-breaking. So in these respects, it is preferable to the (purely) collectivist conditions
I suspect the main criticism of Individualist-Collectivist Hybrid will be that it seems
rather ad hoc. It lacks a unified rationale for the verdicts it gives, sometimes appealing to
individualist considerations, while at other times appealing to quite different collectivist
considerations. However, some degree of disunification seems inevitable on a moderate
view. Indeed, as the earlier quotation from Scanlon makes clear, it is the whole point
of the Close Enough View to distinguish two classes of cases, and to treat these in
different ways. I conclude, therefore, that among the candidates surveyed above, the
most promising interpretation of the Close Enough View, in the context of binary choices
only, is Individualist-Collectivist Hybrid.
4 Non-binary Choices
I turn now to non-binary choices. As I shall show, problems emerge here for all (mini-
mally plausible) moderate views, because these views entail the existence of “obligation
cycles”. As a result, these views must violate certain consistency conditions in the con-
text of non-binary choice. I first explain how moderation leads to obligation cycles, and
why this might be problematic, before considering some possible solutions.
4.1 Obligation Cycles
An important consequence of moderation is that the “close enough” relation must be
intransitive. To illustrate, suppose f is linear and ρ = 1/2. Then, for example, a harm
of size 1 is close enough to a harm of size 2, which is in turn close enough to a harm of
size 3. But the first of these harms is not close enough to the third.34 This of course fits
with the ordinary meaning of “close enough”. Suppose, for example, a married couple
is contemplating taking jobs in different cities, but want to ensure that they will still
34That this holds in general, for any moderate choice function, can be proven as follows. Since f
continuous (because concave) and strictly increasing, there exist x, y ∈ R+ such that
f(x) = ρf(1) + (1− ρ)f(0)
f(y) = ρ2f(1) + (1− ρ2)f(0)
Then we have
f(x)− f(0)
f(1)− f(0) = ρ
f(y)− f(0)
f(x)− f(0) = ρ
f(y)− f(0)
f(1)− f(0) = ρ
2
Now if 0 < ρ < 1, then ρ2 < ρ. So in this case, the harm of getting 0 instead of y is close enough to the
harm of getting 0 instead of x, which is in turn close enough to the harm of getting 0 instead of 1. But
the first of these harms is not close enough to the third.
Is Close Enough Good Enough? — 18
be “close enough” to each other. They may feel that, say, London is close enough to
Paris, and that Paris is close enough to Geneva, but that London is not close enough to
Geneva.
As others have observed, this intransitivity can have troubling consequences.35 Con-
sider, for example, applying Generalised Collectivism to the following outcomes.
1 2 3 4 5 6
a 0 4 4 3 3 3
b 7 0 0 3 3 3
c 7 4 4 0 0 0
Assume f is linear and ρ = 1/2. Compare first a and b. Here the two harms of size 4 in
b (to individuals 2 and 3) are close enough to the one harm of size 7 in a (to individual
1). So, because all harms are relevant, and the total harm is less in a (7 < 4 + 4), we
have a  b. Likewise, comparing b and c, because all harms are relevant, and the total
harm is less in b, we have b  c. But the situation is different when comparing a and c.
In this case, the harms in c are trumped by the harm in a, and therefore are declared
irrelevant. So we have c  a. In summary, we have a cycle: a  b, b  c, c  a.36 I
call this an “obligation cycle” because, recall, a  b means that it is only permissible to
choose a (when a and b are the only options), or, in other words, that it is obligatory to
choose a.
A similar set of outcomes can be constructed for any f and ρ, provided only that
0 < ρ < 1. Thus the combination of Generalised Collectivism, Moderate Aggregation,
and Moderate Non-Aggregation is inconsistent with the following condition.
No Obligation Cycles. For any sequence of outcomes a1, a2, . . . an, if ai  ai+1 for all
i, then an 6 a1.
In this above example, the cycle is a consequence of moderation, resulting from the
combination of both Moderate Non-Aggregation and Moderate Aggregation. In the first
two comparisons (a vs b and b vs c), the aggregationist part of the view is employed,
whereas in the third comparison (a vs c), the non-aggregationist part is employed. It
is this combination of aggregationism and non-aggregationism which, predictably, gives
rise to a cycle. The cycle may be avoided, by “going extreme” in either direction. In the
above example, Extreme Collectivism implies a  b  c, whereas Extreme Individualism
implies c  b  a.
In other cases, however, obligation cycles may arise without any aggregation. Mod-
erate Non-Aggregation, Non-Arbitrariness, and No Obligation Cycles are jointly incon-
sistent. (Notice, Moderate Aggregation is not included here.) The proof is similar to
that given above in the context of Permutation Invariance. Without loss of generality,
assume as before that
f(1/2)− f(0) < ρ(f(1)− f(0))
Now consider the following outcomes.
1 2 3
a 0 1/2 1
b 1/2 1 0
c 1 0 1/2
Compare first a and b. As shown above, it follows that the one harm in b trumps both
harms in a, and so, by Non-Arbitrariness, we have a  b. But by the same argument we
also have b  c and c  a. So we have an obligation cycle.
35See, e.g., Norcross (2002); Parfit (2003); Fleurbaey et al. (2009); Voorhoeve (2014).
36This is also implied by Lexical Generalised Collectivism and Individualist-Collectivist Hybrid.
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Obligation cycles raise special problems in the context of non-binary choice. Suppose
we have an obligation cycle involving a number of options. What then should we say
about a choice in which all of these options are available? According to Parfit, we must
then say that none of the options is permissible (Parfit, 2003, 384). That is, we must
reject the following condition.
No Prohibition Dilemmas. γ(A) 6= ∅.
But this is not quite correct. Rather, we must reject either No Prohibition Dilemmas
or the following condition.
Contraction Consistency. Let A be a subset of B. Then, for any a ∈ A, a ∈ γ(B)
only if a ∈ γ(A).
This requires that a permissible option cannot become impermissible merely as a
result of removing some other options. Contraction may, of course, have the opposite
effect: transforming an option from impermissible to permissible. This might happen
if some superior option is removed. But surely, one might think, if an option is good
enough to choose from the larger set of options, then it must also be good enough to
choose from the smaller set. Thinning the competition must, if anything, make it easier
to win, not harder.
No Prohibition Dilemmas and Contraction Consistency together entail that  is
acyclical. Thus (assuming Non-Arbitrariness) Moderate Non-Aggregation forces us to
reject one of these two conditions. One simple way to extend a choice function from
binary to non-binary choices is by the following condition.
Maximisation. For any a ∈ A, a ∈ γ(A) if and only if, for any b ∈ A, a  b.
This says that an option is permissible just in case it is maximal relative to the
relation . If this relation is interpreted as saying that one option is “at least as good”
as another, then Maximisation tells us to choose one of the “best” options. Clearly
Maximisation implies Contraction Consistency. So if  is cyclical, then Maximisation is
incompatible with No Prohibition Dilemmas. (If every option is worse than some other
option, then no option is best.)
However, there are alternatives to Maximisation which are compatible with No Pro-
hibition Dilemmas, even when  is cyclical. One such alternative substitutes  with its
transitive closure +. This gives us:
Transitive Closure Maximisation. Let +γ be is the transitive closure of  restricted
to A.37 Then, for any a ∈ A, a ∈ γ(A) if and only if, for any b ∈ A, a +γ b.
If we have, for example, a  b, b  c, c  a (an obligation cycle), then Transitive
Closure Maximisation implies γ({a, b, c}) = {a, b, c}. An intuitive rationale for this view
is that the three options are morally “on a par”: each is worse than some alternative. As
there is nothing to separate the options, we may conclude that all three are permissible.
Provided  is complete (which amounts to saying there are no prohibition dilemmas in
binary choices), Transitive Closure Maximisation implies No Prohibition Dilemmas. So
if  is cyclical, then Transitive Closure Maximisation is incompatible with Contraction
Consistency.
Voorhoeve suggests another way of extending Generalised Collectivism. In a non-
binary choice, determining the total relevant harm in a given option is more complicated.
This is because, as noted above, determining the counterfactual harm to an individual is
37More precisely, +γ is the smallest transitive relation on A such that, for all a, b ∈ A, if a  b then
a +γ b. Conditions like this are discussed in, e.g., Sen (1977).
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more complicated. Which of the alternatives to the chosen option should be regarded as
what would have happened otherwise? One solution is to identify this with the best that
could have happened. That is, the harm to an individual in an outcome is determined by
comparing her wellbeing in this outcome with her maximum wellbeing in any outcome.
Formally, for an outcome a ∈ A, individual i is harmed in a, relative to A, if and only if
ai < maxb∈A bi.
The set of individuals harmed in in a, relative to A, is HaA =
⋃
b∈AHab. And the
set of individuals relevantly harmed in a, relative to A, may then be defined as
RaA = {i ∈ HaA : ∀b ∈ A\{a} ∀j ∈ Ia\{i}f(ai)−f(max
c∈A
ci) ≥ ρ(f(bj)−f(max
c∈A
cj))}.
This gives us the following condition.
Global Generalised Collectivism. For any a ∈ A, a ∈ γ(A) if and only if, for any
b ∈ A, ∑
i∈RaA
max
c∈A
f(ci)− f(ai) ≤
∑
i∈RbA
max
c∈A
f(ci)− f(bi)
This clearly implies Non-Arbitrariness and No Prohibition Dilemmas. Therefore, in
combination with Moderate Non-Aggregation it violates Contraction Consistency.
To summarise, moderation entails the existence of obligation cycles (assuming the
very plausible Non-Arbitrariness). Therefore, moderates must reject either No Prohi-
bition Dilemmas or Contraction Consistency, but they have a choice as to which they
reject. If they prefer to reject No Prohibition Dilemmas, they may adopt Maximisation.
On the other hand, if they prefer to reject Contraction Consistency, then they have at
least two options. One is to replace Maximisation with Transitive Closure Maximisation.
Another is to adopt a view like Global Generalised Collectivism.
In my view, Non-Arbitrariness and No Prohibition Dilemmas are non-negotiable.
Thus, in the remainder of the paper, I consider the prospects of rejecting Contraction
Consistency.
4.2 Companions in Guilt
Are violations of Contraction Consistency a cost worth paying for moderation? Contrac-
tion Consistency is not uncontroversial. As others have shown, this condition is violated
by various well-established and seemingly consistent views.38 Moderate aggregationists
may therefore mount a “companions in guilt” defence. If their view is convicted of in-
consistency for violating Contraction Consistency, then many others must be convicted
too. However, this defence, I argue, is not entirely convincing. Moderate views dif-
fer from these other views in an important way, so they should not be prosecuted as
co-defendants.
One class of views which violate Contraction Consistency involve “satisficing”. Unlike
maximising views, which insist on choosing the best option, satisficing views permit
choosing a non-best option, provided it is at least “good enough”. This may seem to
cohere more with so-called “commonsense morality”. For example, while many accept
that they ought to give to charity, few feel obligated to give as much as maximising seems
to demand. From a maximising perspective, Contraction Consistency makes perfect
sense; from a satisficing perspective, less so. Consider, for example, a simple satisficing
view which merely forbids choosing the worst option, permitting all else. Given a choice
between three options, Good, Mediocre, and Bad, listed from best to worst, this view
permits choosing either Good or Mediocre. But when Bad is removed, Mediocre becomes
the worst and therefore no longer permissible, thereby violating Contraction Consistency.
38See, e.g., Sugden (1985); Sen (1993); Tungodden and Vallentyne (2005).
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Another well-known example, suggested by Sen (1993, 501), has a similar structure.
Imagine three slices of cake of varying size: Small, Medium, and Large. Etiquette
dictates that when offered a selection of slices of cake, one ought to forgo the largest
slice, because to take it would be greedy. But this implies that choosing Medium is
permissible when all three slices are offered, but not when Large is withdrawn.
These views seem at least consistent. As Sen points out, the label “Contraction
Consistency” is really a misnomer (Sen, 1993, 499). This condition is not merely a re-
quirement of consistency, at least not in the strict logical sense. The following statements
are not logically inconsistent:
1. Choosing a from {a, b, c} is permissible.
2. Choosing a from {a, b} is not impermissible.
Inconsistency arises only with the addition of certain background assumptions. For
example, these statements are jointly inconsistent with the following:
3. Choosing an option from a set of options is permissible if and only if this option
is not worse than any option in this set.
Together (1) and (3) entail that a is not worse than b. But (2) and (3) entail that a
is worse than b.39 But this is unlikely to trouble proponents of satisficing, because they
reject the background assumption. On their view, an option can be permissible even
when it is worse than some other option.
Notice, however, that satisficers need not reject (3) in its entirety. They need only
reject the left-to-right part, not the right-to-left. That is, while satisficers deny that
being the best option (or one of the best) is necessary for being permissible, they ac-
cept that this is sufficient. However, the conjunction of Moderate Non-Aggregation and
Non-Arbitrariness is incompatible with both necessity and sufficiency, unless the “better
than” relation is cyclical. As shown above, these conditions together entail obligation
cycles. Given acyclicity of “better than”, this implies that some option is impermis-
sible even though it is not worse than any alternative. Notice, neither the satisficing
nor etiquette view entails obligation cycles. Thus a companions in guilt defence seems
unconvincing. In the case of these other views, there is a justification for violating
Contraction Consistency which is not also available to moderate views.
4.3 Intrinsicalism
Voorhoeve pursues a different response. His argument may be presented as follows.40
Violations of Contraction Consistency reveal genuine inconsistencies only in cases where
contracting the choice situation does not have the effect of altering any relevant prop-
erties of the remaining options. If only the intrinsic properties of an option are rele-
vant, where this excludes, in particular, the option’s relations to other options, then all
violations reveal genuine inconsistencies, because intrinsic properties are preserved by
contraction. According to some views, however, an option’s extrinsic properties may
also be relevant. Therefore, such a view may violate Contraction Consistency without
being inconsistent at all. Now, one might object that such views mistakenly count as
relevant properties that really are irrelevant. But the objection, in this case, would not
be that the view is inconsistent. Given this view’s account of relevant properties, its
prescriptions in contraction cases may be perfectly consistent.
39This assumes that “worse than” is irreflexive: an option cannot be worse than itself.
40This is not exactly how Voorhoeve presents the argument. But I believe it amounts to the same
thing.
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For example, it may be argued as follows that the etiquette view is not really in-
consistent. Taking the medium slice when both the large and the small slices are also
on offer differs in a relevant way from doing this when the only alternative is the small
slice: in the latter case, but not the former, taking the medium slice displays greed or
a lack of manners. Therefore, taking the medium slice is not relevantly the same in
both cases.41 Of course, the medium slice of cake itself does not change in its intrinsic
properties. Rather, what changes is how it compares to the other slices on offer. In
the second situation, but not in the first, it is the largest slice. Therefore, since the
etiquette view counts this extrinsic property as relevant, there is nothing inconsistent in
its judgement that choosing the medium slice is permissible in the first situation, but
not in the second.
My framework may be expanded to reflect these ideas as follows. Let an “extended
option” be a pair (a,A) where a ∈ A. For neatness, I shall write aA instead of (a,A).
We may think of aA as “choosing a from A”. Now, let a distributive view be represented
by a a choice function γ combined with an equivalence relation ≡ on the set of extended
options. Interpret aA ≡ bB as meaning that all the relevant properties of a in A are the
same as those of b in B.42
We may then define the following condition.
General Contraction Consistency. Let A be a subset of B such that, for any a ∈ A,
aA ≡ aB. Then, for any a ∈ A, a ∈ γ(B) only if a ∈ γ(A).
This may be regarded as the result of weakening Contraction Consistency so that
violations occur only in cases where all relevant properties are preserved by contraction.
A view that violates this condition seems genuinely inconsistent.
Now, General Contraction Consistency collapses into Contraction Consistency given
the following condition.
Intrinsicalism. If a = b then aA ≡ bB.
This says in effect that the relevant properties of an option do not include its relations
to other options, so these remain the same in every choice situation.
However, moderates may reject Intrinsicalism. Consider, for example, Global Gener-
alised Collectivism. This may be made compatible with General Contraction Consistency
by adopting an equivalence relation such that aA ≡ bB if and only if a = b and, for all
i ∈ Ia, maxc∈A ci−ai = maxc∈B ci− bi. Obviously this violates Intrinsicalism. But I can
think of no weighty independent reason to accept this condition. If we find a moderate
view otherwise attractive, then the fact that it must reject Intrinsicalism in order to
be consistent does not seem a strong objection. Perhaps one consideration in favour of
Intrinsicalism is practical convenience. Decision making is easier if we can treat options
as relevantly the same in all choice situations. This consideration, however, seems fairly
easily outweighed.
One might worry that General Contraction Consistency is almost entirely vacuous.
Any choice function, one might suspect, can be combined with a equivalence relation that
satisfies General Contraction Consistency. We might add that it is not enough merely
to select any old equivalence relation; there must be some story to tell justifying this
selection. But unless a view is entirely arbitrary or random, there will surely be some such
story to tell. What this shows, I believe, is that consistency is a very weak requirement.
We will not get very far in evaluating competing views merely by considerations of
consistency. We need to engage with the substance of these views.
41This general strategy of refining the description of options is explored in detail by Broome (1991,
ch. 5).
42We could instead represent as distributive view as a choice function plus a set of relevant properties,
and then derive the equivalence relation from the latter. For simplicity, I skip this intermediate step.
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4.4 Local vs Global
I’ve argued that we need not be troubled by violations of Contraction Consistency. But
this still leaves two different approaches to extending a moderate choice function from
binary to non-binary choices. Focus now on Generalised Collectivism. One way to extend
this to non-binary choices is by combining it with Transitive Closure Maximisation. I call
this the “local approach”. The other way is to adopt Global Generalised Collectivism.
I call this the “global approach”. Both approaches satisfy No Prohibition Dilemmas
but violate Contraction Consistency (assuming Moderate Non-Aggregation). Which is
preferable? I argue for the local approach.
Notice first that these approaches diverge only in “non-symmetrical” cases. By a
“symmetrical” case I mean one in which the options are generated by successive applica-
tions of the same permutation. An example like this is used above to show that Moderate
Non-Aggregation and Non-Arbitrariness alone are sufficient to create an obligation cy-
cle, without the aid of Moderate Aggregation. In symmetrical cases, both approaches
imply that all options are permissible. This is surely the right conclusion. Due to the
symmetry, there really is nothing to decide between the options, and so it would be
entirely arbitrary to say one option is permissible but another is not. The only other
non-arbitrary conclusion is that no option is permissible (a prohibition dilemma), but
this too would be absurd. In non-symmetrical cases, the local approach still implies that
all options are permissible, but not the global approach.
Consider again the non-symmetrical example presented above.
1 2 3 4 5 6
a 0 4 4 3 3 3
b 7 0 0 3 3 3
c 7 4 4 0 0 0
Assume as before that f is linear and ρ = 1/2. Then, as we’ve seen, Generalised
Collectivism implies an obligation cycle: a  b, b  c, c  a. Combining this with
Transitive Closure Maximisation, we get γ({a, b, c}) = {a, b, c}. On the other hand,
Global Generalised Collectivism implies γ({a, b, c}) = {c}.
But the latter implication seems dubious. In our deliberation between these options,
we may entertain various hypothetical questions. For example, we may ask: “Assuming
for now that it is permissible to choose c, is it also permissible to choose b?” Now, the
harms in c are, we have assumed, close enough to those in b, and moreover the total
harm in c is greater than that in b. So we should conclude that, if it is permissible to
choose c, then it is also permissible to choose b. It would be illegitimate to disregard
the harms in c on the grounds that these are trumped by the harms in a. The question
we are answering is about the permissibility of b and c, not a. When answering this
hypothetical question, the only relevant considerations concern how b compares to c; it
is irrelevant how either of these options compares to a. Therefore, the question reduces
to the binary choice {b, c}. If we believe that it is permissible to choose b from {b, c},
then we should conclude that, on assumption the that it is permissible to choose c from
{a, b, c}, it is also permissible to choose b from {a, b, c}. However, Global Generalised
Collectivism contradicts this conclusion, because it says only c is permissible.
To put this more formally, my objection to Global Generalised Collectivism is that
(combined with Moderate Non-Aggregation) it violates the following condition.43
Expansion Consistency. For any a, b ∈ A, If a  b and b ∈ γ(A), then a ∈ γ(A).
43This is weaker than the condition often called “Expansion Consistency”. But it is strong enough for
our purposes.
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This condition seems to me very plausible. As with Contraction Consistency, I do not
consider Expansion Consistency to be a requirement of consistency, despite its name.
So my objection is not that Global Generalised Collectivism is inconsistent. Moreover,
I am not denying that some extrinsic properties of options may be relevant. It is true,
for example, that the extrinsic properties of a change when the choice situation expands
from {a, b} to {a, b, c}. But these changes should not be relevant to the hypothetical
question whether a is permissible on the assumption that b permissible. With respect to
this question, the relevant extrinsic properties of a are only its relations to b, and these
do not change with the addition of c.
To further emphasise this point, consider the following example.
1 2 3 4 5 6
a 0 0 0 0 0 0
b 7 0 0 3 3 3
c 7 4 4 0 0 0
In this case, there is no obligation cycle. Generalised Collectivism implies b  c  a.
Combining this with Transitive Closure Maximisation, gives the intuitively correct result,
γ({a, b, c}) = {b}.44 But Global Generalised Collectivism implies γ({a, b, c}) = {c},
again violating Expansion Consistency. The harms in c are counted as irrelevant, because
they are trumped by the maximum harm in a. But again this does not seem a legitimate
reason to choose c ahead of b, since the harms in c are not trumped by any harm in
b. One might say, a is so clearly unacceptable that it should not really be regarded
as an option at all, making this in effect a choice between b and c only. And Global
Generalised Collectivism could be modified in this way to avoid the problem. We could
say, for example: first eliminate any Pareto-inferior options (in this case a), and then
apply Global Generalised Collectivism to the remaining options. But this seems a little
ad hoc, and, in any case, the problem with the previous example would still remain. A
better solution is to adopt Transitive Closure Maximisation.
5 Conclusion
This completes my survey of candidate interpretations of the Close Enough View. I
conclude that the most promising of the candidates considered is the combination of
Individualist-Collectivist Hybrid and Transitive Closure Maximisation. I cannot claim
that this is the best possible interpretation. My search was restricted to regular choice
functions, and even within this subclass, there may be other options that I have not
considered. Still, I hope to have shown at least that this interpretation is worthy of
further investigation.
What does this tell us about the Close Enough View? Suppose my preferred can-
didate is in fact the best we can do here. Is this good enough? Should we then ac-
cept the Close Enough View, on this interpretation, or instead abandon moderation?
Individualist-Collectivist Hybrid may have some unappealing features. It is not an el-
egant condition, and, as noted above, it may be considered ad hoc. I should also note
that extending this condition to cases of uncertainty may be far from straightforward.
It definitely cannot be anything so simple as maximising the expected value of a social
utility function. Moreover, as noted above, the case for moderation rests largely on in-
tuitions about cases, and we have reason to think these intuitions may be unreliable. So
those with a taste for simplicity, or a less firm commitment to moderation, might see the
investigation above as an argument against the Close Enough View. In any case, I hope
44When  is transitive, Transitive Closure Maximisation agrees with Maximisation.
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to have clarified the issue of aggregation, by displaying some of the options available to
moderates, and some of the costs involved in accepting these.
Appendix
This appendix provides some formal definitions that are too complicated to be included
in the main text.
I first define an “extended” version of Lexical Generalised Collectivism, which recog-
nises a more fine-grained division of options into levels of relevance. These levels may
be recursively defined as follows.
1. R1ab = Rab
2. for k > 1,
Rkab = {i ∈ Hab : ∀j ∈ Hba \Rk−1ba f(bi)− f(ai) ≥ ρ(f(aj)− f(bj))
It may be helpful to think of these levels as being defined by the following procedure.
Begin with Hab and Hba, the sets of individuals harmed in a and b respectively. Then
define R1ab and R1ba exactly as Rab and Rba above. Next, set aside the individuals in R1ab
and R1ba, and define R2ab and R2ba exactly as R1ab and R1ba, except this time consider only
the remaining individuals. Then repeat this procedure to define R3ab and R3ba, and so on.
(Notice, these levels are by definition “nested”: R1ab ⊆ R2ab ⊆ R3ab . . .)
The idea is that higher levels (where R1 is the highest) are given lexical priority over
lower levels. First, we minimise the total significance of unprevented harms to individuals
in R1ab and R1ba. In the case of a tie, we then minimise the same for individuals in R2ab
and R2ba. And so on. This gives us the following condition.
Extended Leximin Total Relevant Harm. a  b if and only if, for all k, if∑
i∈Rk
ab
f(bi)− f(ai) >
∑
i∈Rk
ba
f(ai)− f(bi)
then there exists some j < k such that∑
i∈Rj
ab
f(bi)− f(ai) <
∑
i∈Rj
ba
f(ai)− f(bi).
Now I give a formal definition of Lexical Extreme Individualism. For outcomes a
and b (with Ia = Ib), let hab be an injective function from {1, 2, . . . |Hab|} into Ia such
that, for any i, j, if i < j then f(bhab(i)) − f(ahab(i)) ≥ f(bhab(j)) − f(ahab(j)). So hab(i)
is the individual who suffers the i-th most significant harm in a. Note that adjacent
individuals in this sequence may suffer equally significant harms. Then we have the
following definition.
Lexical Extreme Individualism.
1. If |Hab| ≤ |Hba|, then a  b if and only if, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |Hab|, if
f(bhab(i))− f(ahab(i)) > f(ahba(i))− f(bhba(i))
then for some 1 ≤ j < i,
f(ahba(i))− f(bhba(i)) > f(bhab(i))− f(ahab(i))
2. If |Hab| < |Hba|, then a  b if a  b, and b  a if a 6 b.
A formal definition of Lexical Generalised Individualism is obtained by inserting ρ
into the definition above in the appropriate places.
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